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In recent years, civil society has become the darling of economists, political 
scientists and policy makers both in the Western and non-Western world. The 
discourse on the modern concept of civil society in Nepal is fairly new despite 
the age-old existence of civic practices. But those civic practices of civil society 
were of a different kind, endowed with different responsibilities, and can hardly 
be equated with the current notion of civil society. That was a civil society with 
a limited civic sphere, engaged in indigenous activities which contributed lit-
tle towards citizenship building. The reason for this was that the civic space 
was either pre-determined or restricted by the state due to a primitive political 
structure based on parochial thinking. This might be one of the reasons why 
civic resurgence did not emerge until political change irrupted in the nineties. 
The Third Wave of democratization that swept away undemocratic regimes 
worldwide in fact led to a worldwide growth of civil society. In most cases the 
wave itself was the repercussion of a worldwide civic resurrection that could 
not be contained within the borders of nation-states.
The current notion of civil society that emerged after Nepal’s 1990 modest 
political change is the recent phenomenon. Also, the United Nations (UN) decade 
of conference1 –which took place in nineties– provided ample opportunities for 
the growth of modern Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) worldwide. These 
world conferences and other multilateral organisations have given generous 
space to Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to be active participants in 
the democratization process and economic development of the nation-states. 
And through them donors have channelled large amounts of money for this 
purpose. The result, however, was somewhat disturbing, as this has produced 
a Hobbesian nature of civil society in Third World countries, which kept them-
selves busy vying for power and added a layer of new elites. The high-ranking 
retired bureaucrats, politicians and urban elites instantly usurped up the civic 
sphere and became direct beneficiaries of this process; and siphoned off large 
amounts of donors money. Their contribution to socio-economic development 
and the democratization process was meagre and questionable.
Today the debate on civil society is such that it has reached its pinnacle and 
the word itself has been used, abused and overused by policy makers, donors, 
academicians and armchair political pundits. The overarching aim of this paper 
is to analyse the reception and domestication of this powerful idea and what 
impact it has had on Nepali politics over the years. For this, I will first analyse 
1 In the 1990s, major UN conferences/conventions/summits took place, among others, the Vienna Convention 
on Human Rights, the Rio Summit on Environment, and the Beijing Conference on Women.
SOUTH-SOUTH COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME
why there has been an ever increasing interest in civil society in Nepal. My point 
of analysis is mostly based on the role of civil society in political processes, 
namely, how the Nepali civil society has reacted towards the democratization 
process and how the idea has been resonating time and again. I have chosen 
the 1990s as the benchmark for this discussion.
2. The Development of Civil Society as an Idea
The historical development of civil society goes back to sixteenth-century English 
political thought, when the term used to refer to the state, whereas contemporary 
usage tends to contrast civil society and the state. The seventeenth century 
theorists of civil society based their argument on the concept of a social contract. 
For them, civil society (societas civilis) was a rule of law in which citizens gave 
up the freedom of the state of nature in exchange for the guarantee of certain 
rights –security for Hobbes, plus liberty and property for Locke. Later definitions 
of civil society included the idea of an active citizenry checking violations of the 
social contract by the state.
Hegel’s nineteenth-century notion of civil society included the market, 
whereas the contemporary concept tends to regard civil society as a non-profit 
sector. Similarly, Antonio Gramsci regarded civil society as an arena where class 
hegemony forges consent; Karl Marx regarded civil society as a structure to 
serve the interests of the capitalist bourgeoisie, whereas much contemporary 
discussion treats civil society as a site of disruption and dissent. Alex de Toc-
queville regarded civil society as an essential bulwark of liberal democracy. 
Similarly Mary Kaldor defines civil society as the medium through which a 
social contract between the governing institutions and the governed is negoti-
ated and reproduced. This includes defining moments –such as constitutional 
conventions and round tables– as well as everyday public pressure through the 
media, political parties, churches, NGOs, and the like. For Kaldor, civil society 
is inextricably linked to individual rights. It will suffice to add therefore that the 
ubiquity of civil society in both critical literature and popular commentary has 
not led to any clear consensus about its exact meaning and role. What is true 
is that civil society is private in origin but public in action.
The modern concept of civil society was reinvented in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America in the eighties and it has subsequently spread to all corners of 
globe through intellectual exchange, activist discourse and the official language of 
politicians and development donors. It has gradually become a terminological fad 
in academic, media, and policy circles in the post-nineties political environment. 
The idea of civil society has been employed in a variety of often contradictory 
senses to legitimate sundry intellectual and political projects.
There is growing agreement about the importance of civil society, but 
there is also growing disagreement about its exact meaning. In the contempo-
rary revival of the idea of civil society, the concept has come to mean different 
things for different people in different places, causing a great deal of ambiguity 
and confusion. For instance, in the American context the civil society argument 
is employed in order to underline the need to promote and strengthen a net-
work of solidarity among citizens who are otherwise passive and individualistic 
(Putnam, 1995). In contrast the idea of civil society in Eastern Europe is invoked 
to counter the state and to celebrate citizenship values and individual rights 
(Seligman, 1992). However, in many Third World and post-colonial societies the 
argument is directed to state and market where both are being controlled by 
dominant elites. The idea is that it is civil society that can control, if not entirely 
transform, the state and press it into the service of democracy and social jus-
tice (Mohapatra 2003: 294). The civil society realm has been used to express 
opposition both to the state and market. That is the reason why Lewis (2002: 
4) has rightly noted that “different local meanings (have) been created around 
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the concept as part of an increasingly universal negotiation between citizens, 
states, and markets”, seemingly confirming Van Rooy’s (1998) famous quip that 
the concept’s inherent vagueness is part of its appeal.
3. The Rise of Civil Society as a Political Tool
The growing number of coalitions of civil society groups now claim the right to 
have a say in everything from nuclear arms control negotiations to the opera-
tions of multinational corporations. Wherever we look, activities beyond the 
state and business sectors are on the march: Self-help groups care for the 
sick and disseminate new farming methods; campaign for human rights; action 
groups resist the construction of dams; journalists campaign against censor-
ship; social movements press for minority rights; mass protests campaign for 
more democracy and a just society; foreign aid is disbursed via NGOs, so that 
a large proportion of resources are beyond the control of the state. However, 
civil society cannot by itself spark the overthrow of an authoritarian system and 
replace it with a democratic one. Neither can interest groups, which often have 
narrowly-defined and specific agendas, simply take the place of political parties 
and replicate their foundations (Elliott, 2003: 328). What can do is collect diverse 
forces into a common platform and exert pressure both on state and market 
where necessary and promote an inclusive political culture.
Interestingly, the engagement of civil society in various socio-political 
spectrums is fairly new. This phenomenon has enabled civil society to emerge 
as an alternative global power. The bottom line, however, is why the idea of civil 
society has been projected as an alternative source of power in nation building 
when state machineries play a major part in maintaining national and international 
order. The majority of arguments in this regard stem from terminology which 
carries strong moral overtones and effectively excludes negative and destructive 
associations. The anticipation that civil society bridges societal gaps, builds up 
an inclusive and just society, challenges authoritarian states and international 
regimes with the help of global civil society, and eventually helps to resolve 
conflict(s) further elevates its role in this realm.
There are many schools of thought that hail civil society’s role in addressing 
fault lines, which in turn helps to resolve/transform conflicts and plays a significant 
role in citizenship building. First, modern society has three basic components, 
‘capital, state, and the people with all their associations and organisations con-
stituting civil society’ (Galtung, 1996: 152). Civil society binds them and facilitates 
people to come together for a whole variety of public activities. Civil society in this 
regard works as locus standi for citizens who can freely organize themselves into 
groups and associations at various levels in order to make the formal bodies of 
the state authority adopt policies in consonant with their perceived interests. The 
‘platform’ that civil society provides is the real ‘constituency’ of power where peo-
ple from different walks of life discuss problems and find sustainable solutions.
Secondly, civil society is not non-political; it is non-state but not anti-state 
and anti-people. In its non-state functions, civil society covers both social and 
political activities. Civil society increases civic engagement and stands out as 
the single most important proximate explanation for the difference between 
peace and violence. Civic engagement among various strata of society builds 
up trust and promotes political culture (Putnam, 1993) among ruling classes. 
Varshney in his finding in India argues that where such works of engagement 
and political culture exist (emphasis added), tensions and conflicts are regulated 
and managed; where they are missing, communal identities lead to endemic 
and ghastly violence (Varshney, 2002).
Thirdly, society, rather than the state, is the legitimate source of any power. 
Civilian forces such as political parties, parliamentarians, NGOs, professional 
bodies, peasant leagues, cooperatives, ethnic and socio-cultural associations, 
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etc. are critical components because their movements can prepare people psy-
chologically for desired change and provide them with choices to oppose any 
policy or action that is harmful to them as well as explore alternatives to it (Dahal, 
1997: 15-6). Fourthly, the state belongs to its people (that is, the legitimacy of 
any changes lies with people’s consent), and the mobilisation of ‘people power’ 
(Havel 1992) against repressive regimes or ‘conflicting parties’ helps to resolve 
problems. Hence the civil society movement is important because it consolidates 
people’s power from below by strengthening grassroots institutions, values, 
initiatives, and creativity, from above by democratising state institutions, and 
from outside by creating a constituency for revitalising and reforming the func-
tions of multinational institutions such as the UN in response to global popular 
consciousness (Dahal 1997: 17). This can exert pressure on decision-makers 
to reach a peaceful settlement of conflict including the formulation of policies 
and practices designed to the address root causes of conflict.
Fifthly, aspirations on civil society have been drawn from the fact that civil 
societies are characteristically non-violent and protect individual and group 
freedoms from Hobbesian nation-states, Leviathan world order and irresponsible 
‘non-state actors’ who are fascinated by their own perception of interests. For 
Kaldor, even during conflict, civil society does exist and can exert influence on 
conflicting parties to maintain order in society. Kaldor believes that if violence and 
predation are to be found in what are considered zones of peace, it is possible to 
find islands of civility in nearly all the war zones (Kaldor, 2001: 110) as opposed 
to the fact that civil society can only serve or exist as an effective foundation for 
democracy where there are credible functioning state institutions and strong 
political parties with deep roots in society. She argues that it is always possible 
to identify local advocates of cosmopolitanism, people and places that refuse 
to accept the politics of war – islands of civility (Kaldor 2001: 120). And it is this 
island of civility that can bring about changes in all sectors of humanity. Because 
civility increases the continuous engagement of citizens even during political 
crisis and puts democracy on the right track and minimizes conflicts. Moreover, 
the incorporation of civil society organizations in the governance process not 
only contributes to sustainable peace but also addresses the urgent tasks of 
economic modernization, political liberalisation, and social inclusion because 
they are the real stakeholders in governance.
Whatever the rationalities of civil society are, the latter plays a crucial role 
in nation building. That said, civil society instils a feeling of citizenship among 
citizenry. Civil society consists of the sum of citizens and the corporations in-
volved in it. More importantly, every individual in a civil society is a free citizen in a 
constitutional republic. Civil society plays an essential role in insisting on respect 
for existing rights, working to ensure that politicians and state officials remain 
accountable for their actions. This is achieved through a variety of means, includ-
ing resort to the judiciary, media campaigns, and protests. Equally important is 
that civil society can often play a crucial role in many activities such as setting 
public agendas, including demanding new laws and new rights. Civil society 
plays a direct role in advocating change in the corridors of power with the state 
and developing alternative policies in formulating inclusive citizenship through 
state-civil society synergy. By and large it is the civic space of civil society that 
promotes the concept of citizenship by involving citizens into the institutional life 
of the state without any discrimination based on caste, creed, sex, economic 
status, educational attainment etc., transforms sovereignty of the state to the 
people, and elevates their status from raitis to public.
However, all is not well in the civil society realm –their impact is often 
ambivalent. Increasing political and social mobilisation in civil societies does 
not necessarily lead to democracy and welfare –it can also spark off unrest 
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and upheaval (Trentmann, 2000: 38-45)2. Overall, the term ‘civil society’ itself 
is blurred and vague –what constitutes civil society (all NGOs, professional and 
intermediary associations), as well as who belongs in civil society and who 
does not (what happens, for instance, with terrorists’ organizations), is a most 
contested point in the study of civil society. Moreover, the relationship between 
the state and non-state actors is plagued with ambiguities and it is not clear 
where the role of the state ends and the role of non-state actors begins.
While discussing civil society in the Nepali context, it is worthwhile to 
note that many civil society organizations have mushroomed with the dawn of 
democracy in the nineties. The civic movement has taken further momentum 
at the height of escalating insurgency. But the million dollar question is whether 
we have a ‘civil society’ that can truly promote the sense of belonging towards 
nation (by promoting the notion of civic citizenship which bears both rights and 
responsibilities for citizens and accelerates the civic sphere of civil society), that 
addresses social and political bias.
4. State of Civil Society in Nepal
The modern view on civil society (Nagrik Samaj –the Nepalis equivalent for 
civil society) as in the rest of South Asia subscribes to the western neoliberal 
approach. This exported modern concept of civil society grossly discounts the 
organic civic concept developed during the Vedic period. For the most part, the 
process of modernity in this sector has either superseded or destroyed traditional 
forms of duty-bound rural civil society organisations and resulted in the growth 
of urban-based, self-interested, elite civil society organisations.
After the political change experienced during the 1990s, the country went 
through successive political crises. The situation further deteriorated when the 
Maoist insurgency struck the nation in 1996. The mounting insurgency created 
a political vacuum when major political forces neither were able to cement their 
differences nor did they hold tangible negotiations with the Maoists. The situa-
tion finally reached a dead end. Amidst this, civil society took greater initiative to 
bring major stakeholders (vis-à-vis the monarchy, political parties and the Mao-
ist) to the common platform but all in vain. Civil society contributed enormously 
towards different phases of negotiations but did not succeed in breaking the 
ice, partly due to the perception of interests of the parties involved both in the 
conflict and in the negotiations, but also because civil society itself was not in a 
position to exert pressure due to the ‘nature of the conflict’ (regime change). It 
was partly because the elite, urban-based civil society did not command public 
mandate and the Maoists were sceptical of it. The deadlock saw a light at the 
end of the tunnel when agitating seven party alliances (SPA) backed up by civil 
society reached an operational agreement with Maoists at the end of 2005. 
Since then, Nepalese civil society organisations have played a vital role both in 
taking the movement ahead and cautioning political leaders.
Ironically, to our dismay, the civil society realm is not clear in the Nepali 
context. Civil society has frequently used in different aspects projecting it as an 
answer to every social malaise without clearing off epistemic hurdles and its 
parameters. The bias hinges both on its theorization and application. There is 
no explanation as to why the realm has been called civil society. And the biggest 
challenge lies with its application for different purposes by involving different types 
of groups. This poses a real theoretical challenge when it comes to define what 
civil society in Nepal is, whom it represents and what its parameters are. These 
unanswered issues are crucial when interpreting Nepalis civil society.
2 For detailed discussion see “Venezuela’s Civil Society Coup” in World Policy Journal, Summer 2002, pp 
38-45 and Trentmann 2000: 3-46.
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What has been observed, however, is that joining the civil society club 
has become a norm dejure, and so is bringing out protests, closures by wear-
ing the civil society tag whether they are desirable or not. This practice has 
distorted the exact meaning and its location. Another problem when theorizing 
on civil society is that both civil society and NGOs are interchangeably used to 
acknowledge each other. Part of reasons is a phenomenon that civil society is 
legally and analytically equated with the NGO, which is a “de facto definitional 
amendment” of civil society, but also a manifestation of the “inability of academics 
and analysts” to differentiate between these two terms (Tamang, 2003: 15-17). 
Practically, this was also the project developed by the donors and the Nepali 
state. Firstly, donors –given the disparities within civil society and the greater 
capacity of educated elites to organize. A key challenge for donors committed 
to poverty reduction is identifying ways of supporting organizations of the poor, 
rather than organizations claiming to act on behalf of the poor and of creating 
spaces where the voices of the poor can be heard. However, as Howell (2001) 
said, donor engagement with civil society has a marked urban bias. Secondly 
from the part of state, this was the project developed by retired bureaucrats, 
judges, government officials, urban-based elites, and chatterer’s group who 
wanted to maintain status quo.
There are two types of civil society in Nepal. The first one, truly speaking, 
grew out of the isation culture such as NGOisation of service, globalization, liber-
alization, and privatization, and is supported by donors. The civic sphere created 
by this isation culture is largely populated by the self-declared conglomerate of 
urban elites who prefer to be called civil society leaders. They have made little 
or no attempt to address societal issues nor have they extended their activities 
in the peripheral areas, let alone engaging with wider civil society. These elites of 
the Nepalis civil society by contrast have treated citizens merely as consumers, 
thereby ignoring basic tenets of civil society. The second type of civil society 
in Nepal is promoted by political elites and political parties. This includes large 
numbers of interests groups, trade unions built on political lineage, which work 
in line with political interests and protects their own interests. This civil society 
is oppositional in nature. To some extent it has helped to foster the democratic 
rights of the people and the creation of a responsible government.
However, when we put both types of civil society into one basket what 
is clear, to our dismay, is that the civic space in Nepal is restricted to politically 
and economically organized sectors of society and it is only this economically 
well-organized section that has benefited from the modernization of this concept. 
And marginal groups do not find it easy to gain entry into the civil society forums. 
It would mean that ordinary people do not possess access either to a space or 
to the freedom that is necessary for democratic engagement. What needs to be 
emphasized is that if the benefits of civil society are restricted to these sections it 
just shows that the project of civil society is far from being complete. As freedom 
in these cases is being realized by a minority and not by the people as a whole, 
the basic ethics of civil society can hardly be said to exist in any meaningful way. 
When democracy no longer encourages the well-being of citizens along the lines 
of civil society it is largely because the ethics of freedom are being subverted by 
technological rationality or by market principles or by the majority principle or by 
the pure and dogmatic assertions of command or group equality (as in caste-
based) politics. None of these are compatible with the ethics of civil society, nor 
with the cultivation of citizenship. The civic practice itself becomes very much 
the antithesis of civil society’s norms. Civil society in this context is nothing but 
politics of “narcissism” as Neera Chondhoke (2003: 25) defined it.
“The exclusionary policy adopted by the state and treatment of citizen 
merely as ‘consumers’ both by state and civil society has developed a ‘con-
sumerism’ notion of civil society. The widening gap between political elites 
11OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
urban-based ‘columnised’ civil society, duty-bound rural civic organizations, 
and ordinary citizens has deconstructed the true notion of civil society, let alone 
construction of ‘civic citizenship’. The state and society are fragmented in every 
aspect, citizenship values are deeply internalized by the people, social conflicts 
are largely undermined [...]” (Dahal, 2006).
However, in recent years the civil society movement has emerged to ex-
press the disillusionment of the middle class with politics, economics, corrupt 
political processes, the Maoist insurgency, the inability of the state to undertake 
the task of furthering development, for an inclusive democracy and a just society. 
But the biggest dilemma is that the Nepalis civil society neither is democratic nor 
does it carry egalitarian values. The civic sphere by contrast is largely populated 
by the urban elites and has included provision of hierarchy (that is, senior civil 
society leaders, junior civil society leaders, etc.) in rank and file. They have grossly 
failed to accommodate those who cannot form their own associations either to 
bargain with the state or the market, or to protect their interests (downtrodden, 
underprivileged). Hence, civil society is not a harmonious space where citizens 
associate with each other to influence public; rather, it is a site for contestation 
among different groups, as much against each other for their rightful place and 
for the benefits of development, as against the state (p. 276). Overall civil society 
has not uniformly promoted the notion of citizenship. It has ignored some sec-
tions of society at the expenses of others.
The NGOs and civil society boom, and the disunity among them, reflect 
the country’s social asymmetry in caste, class, ethnicity, gender and regions. 
The biggest problem is how citizens qualify to be members of civil society and 
vice versa where civil society is based on class interest and the citizenship 
produced so is exclusive as against the need of addressing fault-lines of critical 
mass in order to reconstruct the civil society based on civic citizenship which 
will set this nation on the right track.
5. Civil Society as a New Avatar
The civil society movement supported by political parties played a considerable 
role in reinstalling democracy in 1990. Nevertheless, the strength of its period 
of opposition against bad people (Panchas), bad system (Panchayat) became 
the weaknesses of its period of rule during the transitional period in the nineties, 
thereby distorting its meaning from civil to uncivil society. This was a distinct de-
parture from the general model of civil society. However, civil society led by political 
movement played a decisive role in peacefully steering ahead the Jana Andolan 2 
of spring 2006 that virtually led to the fall of the royal regime’s citadel. The revival 
of civil society, a uniquely different in nature, upsurge against the royal regime is 
a classic example. This is a towering achievement of civil society in modern times 
and has set a precedent that political revolutions can bring about changes without 
spilling blood. The underlying feature of this movement was that the movement 
was remarkably peaceful and self-regulated; atomised right-based civil society (a 
self-enlightened liquid mass, not the urban-based elite civil society) took a front 
seat for the first time as a bid to end the autocratic regime for ever.
The frequency in rallies aftermath of Jana Andolan 2 taken out by civil 
society organizations and their leaders in the name of khabardari julus shows an 
increased level of political awareness and unflinching faith on democracy for 
sustainable peace. Civil society’s euphoria has provoked everyone to be known 
as civil society activists. If one doesn’t belong to a political party, he or she can 
easily join the civil society club, and come out in the street chanting slogans 
that suit his or her interests. This is considered the easiest way to have things 
done as well as to wash up any past misdeeds.
But civic euphoria expressed by unabated protests also poses serious 
challenges as to what type of civil society it will ultimately produce in the long 
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run, because this is simply an unorganized liquid mass often violent in nature. 
Thus it raises more questions than the answers it offers. The biggest worry is 
as to what would happen if this turned into an established trend of bringing 
down political (whether they are desirable or not) systems through. Moreover, 
too much of ‘civic protest’ might lead any nation into becoming a banana state 
where the one who shouts loudest is the one who wins and the country might 
ultimately fall into the hands of anarchists. Furthermore, too much of civic pro-
test might reduce the role of political parties, which can be dangerous for the 
sustainability of democracy. A political order is necessary for a good society. 
Moreover, solutions cannot always be sought through violent protests. And op-
position to the bad system does not always necessarily create a good system. 
The good system only is established if the civil society is civilized. For the time 
being, perhaps this might be the result of public frustration against age-old 
authoritarian rule and deceiving behaviour of political leaders. Therefore one 
cannot outright comment on this post-modern version of Nepali civil society at 
this stage. What is needed, however, to change the modus operandi of civic 
protests? This theoretical and practical fuzziness has a clear breach both in 
literature and discourse and logically puts a question mark on the nature of civil 
society and expectations underpinned on it.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have stated that the existing civil society in Nepal, including the 
surfeit of NGOs, pro-democracy groups, and civil society activists are highly 
laden with their own perception of interests and divided on partisan line with 
one foot in civil society and the other one out of it. Civil society in Nepal is not 
the story of ordinary people living extraordinary lives. It is the story of those who 
are vying for power and would like to maintain status quo by climbing the civil 
society ladder. Hence, theoretically, part of our civil society can be compared 
with the Hobbesian notion (the urban-based power-monger which exists in 
the state of nature); and the liquid unorganised unruly mass that occasionally 
challenges both state and market can be compared with the Gramscian no-
tion of anti-hegemonic civil society and the rest with the Chatterjeeian notion 
of oppositional model that opposes everything that comes in the way through 
protests; it closures whatever comes in the way (positive or negative) without 
really going deep on its repercussions. This paper has also analysed the post-
1990s civil society which, in tandem with political society, contaminated state 
of affairs during the nineties. But it certainly has emerged as an alternative force 
in recent time. In Scott’s words, it has become the weapons of the weak on 
resistance to authority (Goody, 2001: 157). That said, civil society in Nepal is 
going through an empowerment process; exposing various issues confronting 
the nation despite its contradictions. The two models of civil society (the Gram-
scian and Chatterjeeian) put a question mark on the nature of civil society but 
this is obvious in a politically instable state like Nepal, which has been moving 
from crisis to crisis for more than half a century.
The challenge for the Nepalis civil society is to democratise horizontally 
and civilise oppositional movements by making them inclusive, representative 
for a wider arrange of social causes rather than fulfilling the interest of political 
parties; special groups per se or championing objectives of self-declared civil 
society leaders. Hence I have proposed the term ‘inclusive secular civil society’ 
to avoid both the theoretical and the practical bias existing in this field. This can 
perhaps be achieved by introducing civic education in schools; public opinion; 
discourse and pressure by right-based NGOs. This will elucidate a new breed 
of civil society free from clan and tribal loyalty, aiming to engage in the analysis 
of major rules and regulations of society, liberate people from primordial think-
ing and prepare them to rise above personal and familial interests. Only then 
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can we have a true civil society which will assist to translate civic virtues into 
practical life including conflict transformation/resolution.
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